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  This paper presents a cash flow based analysis of the return and risk characteristics of 
European Private Equity Funds. For that purpose a comprehensive data set has been provided 
by Thomson Venture Economics. We document the typical time pattern of cash  flows for 
European private equity funds. Specifically, it is recorded that the average European private 
equity fund draws down 23% of total committed capital on the vintage date; within the first 
three years 60% of the total commitment is draw down. It turned out that limited partners on 
average get back the money invested slightly after 7 years. 
 
  Over the time period from 1980 to June 2003, we calculate various  performance 
measures. For that purpose we use only liquidated funds or funds with a small residual net 
asset value. Under this restriction one specific data set consists of 200 funds. We document a 
cash flow based IRR of 12.7% and an average excess-IRR of 4.5% relative to the MSCI 
Europe equity index. In order to circumvent the problems associated with the IRR-approach 
we focus on the alternative public market equivalent approach. There it is assumed that cash 
flows generated by a private equity fund are reinvested in a public market benchmark index. 
We record an average PME of 0.96 and a value-weighted average PME of 1.04. 
 
  Based on the PME-approach we develop a viable methodology to estimate the return 
and risk characteristics of European private  equity funds and the correlation structure to 
public markets. As a benchmark index we used the MSCI Europe Equity Index as well as the 
J.P.Morgan Government Bond Index. Over the period  1980-2003  private equity funds 
generated an overperformance with respect to the bond index and two of our three samples an 
underperformance with respect to the equity index. Over the period 1989-2003 private equity 
funds generated an overperformance with respect to both indexes. 
 
  Finally, we analyze to what extent performance measures are associated with specific 
funds characteristics, like size, payback  period and vintage year, respectively. While the 
payback period and the vintage year seem to have a statistically significant influence on a 
fund's performance, the results with respect to size are inconclusive. 
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Private Equity has recently faced an increasing public awareness in Europe.
From an economic perspective the allegedly positive impact of venture cap-
ital and private equity on economic growth is emphasized. From an asset
management perspective it seems that private equity has become one of the
most important alternative asset classes. It can be shown, in fact, that in-
stitutional investors1 have increased their share of wealth allocated to this
asset class substantially. This is also conﬁrmed by the volume of capital
raised by the private equity industry. According to statistics provided by
EVCA, this ﬁgure increased from Euro 4.2bn in 1992 to over Euro 48bn in
2000. Of course, after the stock market downturn starting in 2000 these cash
inﬂows into the private equity industry decreased as well; however, even in
2002 about Euro 27bn have been invested.2 Recently published ﬁgures indi-
cate that institutional investors are now going to increase their private equity
portfolio ratio giving way to a more optimistic outlook for the future of this
industry.3
Despite this long run increasing importance of private equity as an asset
class there’s only a limited understanding of the economic characteristics of
this industry. For the time being, three important topics are discussed in
this context. First, the question whether private equity enhances economic
growth is discussed.4 Second, the information advantages of allocating sav-
ings through a private equity contract are discussed. Third, the performance
characteristics of private equity investments are analyzed. This paper aims
to make a contribution with respect to this last issue.
Speciﬁcally, it may extend the existing literature for the following three
reasons. First, for the ﬁrst time a comprehensive cash ﬂow based performance
analysis of a large data set of European private equity funds is presented.
For that purpose we analyze cash ﬂow data of 777 European private equity
1Banks are the largest source for private equity funds. In fact, 25.7% of total funds
raised in 1998-2002 stem from the banking industry. Pension funds contributed 23.1% and
funds raised from insurance companies were the third largest source at 12.7% of total funds
raised. Cf. European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA) Yearbook
2003.
2Cf. EVCA Yearbook 2003.
3The European institutional investors want to increase their private equity portfolio
ratio from 1.1% to 3.2% within the next 5 years in average. Cf. Mackewicz (2004)
4Cf. Gompers/Lerner (1999) for an extensive overview and Caselli/Gatti (2004) for a
Europe-focused discussion.
3funds over the period 1980 to 2003 provided by Thomson Venture Economics.
Second, we develop an approach where performance ﬁgures can be derived
without relying on net asset values disclosed by the general partners of pri-
vate equity funds. This is an important advantage as it is often argued that
net asset values are aﬀected by strategic valuation decisions of the fund man-
agement. Third, as a corollary we are able to give some insight into the cash
ﬂow patterns of European private equity funds.
The paper is organized as follows: First, we start with a brief overview of
the literature in chapter 2. Second, in chapter 3 we describe the dataset and
in chapter 4 some important cash ﬂow characteristics of private equity funds
are highlighted. Third, in chapter 5 we record commonly used performance
measures like the IRR or the excess-IRR. However, as the shortcomings of
the IRR-method are well known we develop a methodology based on the
public market equivalent-approach already known in the literature. Chapter
7 summarizes the results and gives a brief outlook.
2 Related Literature
Due to the limited availability of return data there are only a few empirical
papers dealing with risk and return characteristics of private equity. Im-
portant research has been presented by Ljungqvist/Richardson(2003) and
Kaplan/Schoar(2003). Both papers deal with returns of US-based private
equity funds.
Ljungqvist/Richardson(2003) analyze cash ﬂow data provided by one of
the largest institutional investors in private equity in the US between 1981
and 1993. They document that it takes several years for the capital to be
invested and slightly less than seven years for the capital to be returned to
the investor. They investigate various determining factors for the dynamics
of these cash ﬂow patterns and come to the conclusion that these schedules
do not arise by chance but depend on the underlying market conditions.
For their sample they calculate excess-IRRs to the S&P 500 of ﬁve to eight
percent per year.
Kaplan/Schoar(2003) used a data set from Thomson Venture Economics
which includes 746 funds of the years 1980 to 2001. Over the sample pe-
riod, they demonstrate that the average returns are equal to that of the S&P
500 net of management fees by using the public market equivalent (PME)
approach. They found PMEs in the range from 0.96 to 1.05 in average. Fur-
4thermore, they document a strong persistence of funds’ returns. In addition,
they present evidence that market entry in private equity is cyclical and that
funds starting in boom times perform worse. It will be interesting to com-
pare these US-based results with European-based results as presented in this
paper.
As an alternative paper, Cochrane(2003) focuses on the portfolio company
level. Their performance is measured by using a dataset from Venture One
which consists of the data of the ﬁnancing rounds of 7.765 companies. After
adjusting his results for the survivorship bias, the author calculates mean
average returns to be equal to 59% with a standard deviation of 107%.
Chen/Baierl/Kaplan(2002) examine 148 venture capital funds in the Thom-
son Venture Economics data set that have been liquidated before 1999. By
assuming intermediate cash ﬂows to be reinvested at the IRR they ﬁnd an
annual average return of 45% with a standard deviation of 115%. The re-
sults are quite similar to those of Cochrane, who uses the same reinvestment
hypothesis. Rouvinez(2003) proposes another cash ﬂow based approach. By
assuming that cash ﬂows are reinvested at a constant interest rate over time
he is able to derive a risk and return assessment for a set of more than hun-
dred private equity funds provided by the Thomson Venture Economic data
set. His results indicate an average return of 14.3% with a standard devia-
tion of 34.4% for private equity funds with a vintage year between 1980 and
1990. Weidig/Mathonet(2004) analyze the risk proﬁles of direct investments
in portfolio companies and investments in private equity funds from 1980
to 1998 in detail. They conclude that there is a diversiﬁcation beneﬁt for
funds and funds-of-funds. The risk proﬁle of a fund is relatively symmetric
distributed and the probability of not getting back the total capital invested
is stated as 30%.
In contrast to these cash ﬂow based research papers, a few papers try
to assess the return of private equity funds on the basis of disclosed net as-
set values. Bygrave/Timmons(1992) examine venture capital funds and ﬁnd
an average internal rate of return based on net asset values of 13.5% for
1974-1989. Thomson Venture Economics and EVCA report quarterly aver-
age IRRs based on net asset values for the US and for Europe. EVCA(2003)
reports a cumulative annualized IRR based on net asset values of 4.1% for
1999-2002 and 10.1% for 1992-2002. Getmansky et al.(2003) derive an econo-
metric time series model which considers return smoothing as a result of illiq-
uidity in investment portfolios. Emery(2003) transfers this methodology to
private equity investments and documents evidence of stale pricing of private
5equity returns. The average annual return diﬀerence between BO funds and
the S&P 500 is 7.14% and the corresponding excess-return for VC funds and
the Nasdaq is 7.45% for the time period from 1986-2001.
A completely diﬀerent approach is used by Bauer/Bilo/Zimermann(2001).
They concentrate on a set of 229 publicy traded private equity vehicles. Ev-
idently, in this way a straightforward performance calculation applies. They
document substantially larger Sharpe ratios of 1.5 for listed private equity
ﬁrms than for traditional asset classes. They calculate a positive correlation




We use a dataset of European private equity funds that has been provided by
Thomson Venture Economics (TVE).5 It should be noted that TVE uses the
term private equity to describe the universe of all venture investing, buyout
investing and mezzanine investing.6 Actually, we have been provided with
various information related to the timing and size of cash ﬂows, residual
net asset values (NAV), fund size, vintage year, fund type, fund stage and
liquidation status for a total of 791 funds in the time period 1980-2003. Some
14 of these funds have been funds of funds. We excluded these funds from our
data set as they combine a number of single private equity funds and, hence,
provide redundant information for the purpose of this study. Moreover, given
the small sample size it will not be possible to draw general conclusions with
respect to the performance of this particular fund type.
As far as the diﬀerent fund types and stages are concerned it should be
noted that we use, in accordance with TVE, the following deﬁnitions:
Type deﬁnitions:
• Venture capital funds (VC): TVE uses the term to describe the universe
of venture investing. It does not include buyout investing, mezzanine
5TVE is recording private equity data for ﬁve diﬀerent world regions. One of them is
Europe.
6Fund of fund investing and secondaries are also included in this broadest term. TVE
is not using the term to include angel investors or business angels, real estate investments
or other investing scenarios outside of the public market.
6investing, fund of fund investing or secondaries. Angel investors or
business angels are also not be included in the deﬁnition.
• Buyout funds (BO): TVE uses the term to describe the universe of
buyout investing and mezzanine investing. It does not include venture
investing, fund of fund investing or secondaries. Angel investors or
business angels are also not be included in the deﬁnition.
Stage deﬁnitions:
• Early Stage (ES): A fund investment strategy involving investment in
companies for product development and initial marketing, manufactur-
ing and sales activities. We included seed and start-up funds in this
deﬁnition.
• Balanced/Diversiﬁed (B): A venture fund investment strategy that in-
cludes investment in portfolio companies at a variety of stages of de-
velopment (Seed, Early Stage, Diversiﬁed, Later Stage).
• Late Stage (LS): Development funds provide for the major growth ex-
pansion of a company whose sales volume is increasing. Although the
company has clearly made progress, it may not yet be showing a proﬁt.
The money invested is used to ﬁnance the initial development of the
young company. Later stage fund investment involves ﬁnancing the ex-
pansion of a company which is producing, shipping and increasing its
sales volume. In this deﬁnition, we included all the funds which stage
is signed as development(DEV), expansion(EX) and Late Stage (LS).
• Buyout (BO): TVE uses the term to describe the universe of buyout
investing and mezzanine investing. It does not include venture invest-
ing, fund of fund investing or secondaries. Angel investors or business
angels are also not be included in the deﬁnition. The deﬁnition in-
volves e.g. leverage buyouts (LBOs), management buyouts (MBOs)
and bridge ﬁnancing.
As one can see from Table 1, about 59% of the sample funds are venture
capital funds, while the remaining 41% are categorised as buyout funds. The
average fund size according to the TVE-data is Euro 182.75m7. Variation in
7It should be noted that TVE is calculating the fund size on the basis of committed
capital.
7fund size is considerably high, as the largest fund is 132 times as large as the
median fund. Moreover, as one might expect, buyout funds are on average
about 3.7 times as large as Venture capital funds. As far as the stage of the
sample funds is concerned, it can be seen that one quarter are early stage
funds. As one may expect, the size of the funds diﬀers perceivably depending
on their stage.
Type of Funds All Funds Venture Capital Funds Buyout Funds
Stage of Funds Early Stage Balanced Late Stage VC Total BO Total
Number of Funds 777 197 116 143 456 321
in % 100.0% 25.4% 14.9% 18.4% 58.7% 41.3%
Size in mio. Euro
Average 182.75 70.89 144.13 60.50 86.26 319.81
Median 47.80 28.20 40.35 30.00 31.20 85.20
Stdev 513.04 122.55 435.79 109.38 243.66 722.35
Table 1: Characteristics of All Funds Included in our Data Sample
As far as the liquidation-status is concerned, it should be noted from
Table 2 that only 95 out of the total of 777 funds have been liquidated before
the end of the sample period, ending 30 June 2003. The average size of
the liquidated funds is considerably smaller than that of the non-liquidated
funds. Evidently, the average fund size has become larger for more recent
vintage years. This eﬀect may be driven by the growth of the private equity
industry over the 1990s.
All Funds Liquidated Funds Non-liquidated Funds
Number of Funds 777 95 682
in % 100.0% 12.2% 87.8%
Size in mio. Euro
Average 182.75 52.14 202.87
Median 47.80 26.20 53.10
Stdev 513.04 103.62 546.30
Table 2: All Funds by Liquidation Status
Finally, the vintage year distribution of the sample funds can be found
in Figure 1, the vintage year being the year of fund formation and its ﬁrst
8draw down of capital. In accordance with the growth of the private equity
industry during the 1990s an unprecedented vintage activity took place in
the period 1997 to 2000. However, also during the period 1987 to 1996 a
continuous fundraising activity at a fairly impressive level took place. With
the exception of the year 1992 about 30 to 40 new funds entered the market
every year during this period.
Figure 1: Number of Funds by Vintage Year (Number of Funds: 780)
3.2 Increasing the Data Universe
Before presenting the results in the next section we have to deal with a
problem caused by the limited scope of liquidated funds included in our data
set. Figure 2 show that we have 95 funds that have already been liquidated.
Of course, inferring the performance of a fund on the basis of its cash ﬂows
requires knowing its whole cash ﬂow history. In principle, this is only possible
after a fund’s liquidation. However, given that the age of the liquidated
funds in our sample is about 13 years, one can easily see that restricting
the analysis to liquidated funds could cause a bias as more recently founded
funds would be systematically left out. From Figure 12 and Figure 16 it can
easily be taken that by doing so we would exclude funds that had a very
good performance. Restricting the analysis to liquidated funds only would,
therefore, introduce a negative selection bias into the analysis.
9In order to mitigate this problem diﬀerent approaches have been devel-
oped in the literature. Basically, their starting point is the question whether
it may be possible to infer future cash ﬂows of a fund suﬃciently well on basis
of its cash ﬂow history. If this is the case, it would be possible to include not
yet liquidated funds in the cash ﬂow analysis without incurring a systematic
bias in the analysis.
Unfortunately, a closer look reveals that the problem is more diﬃcult than
it may seem at a ﬁrst glance. For instance, Kaplan/Schoar (2002) pursued
the idea that if the correlation of the IRR (NAV) with the IRR (CF)8 is
high, performance ﬁgures based on one of the return measures should lead
to similar results. As they found this correlation coeﬃcient to be about 0.9
for funds with an age of at least ﬁve years, they concluded that including on
top of the liquidated funds all funds with an age of at least ﬁve years could
enlarge the data universe in their study. For this group of not liquidated
funds they used the IRR (NAV) instead of the IRR (CF). This method,
however, has some severe drawbacks. The fact that the IRR (NAV) and the
IRR (CF) are highly correlated implies only that their changes are correlated
over the funds lifetime. However, this does not imply that they are almost
on the same level. This can easily be seen in ﬁgure 2. Even one or two
years before liquidation both IRR-measures diﬀer substantially. Hence, any
approach stating that funds with a given minimum age would be included in
the sample, like the one used by Kaplan/Schoar (2002), is not suitable for
enlarging the data universe.
We, therefore, propose another way for enlarging the data set. First of
all, from ﬁgure 2 it follows that for doing this we have to make sure that
there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the IRR (NAV) and IRR (CF).
Basically, our idea is the following. When calculating the IRR (NAV) the
residual NAV is considered as a last cash ﬂow paid by the fund. Of course,
the valuation bias caused by this approach is the least important the smaller
the impact of this last hypothetical cash ﬂow is. The ﬁrst and most obvious
way to make sure that this impact is small is to integrate only those funds in
the sample whose residual NAV is small relative to the sum of absolute cash
ﬂows already paid in or out.9 Therefore, we will integrate a non-liquidated
fund into our sample only if it meets the following condition:
8For an explanation of the meaning of these two diﬀerent IRR deﬁnitions cf. section
5.1. Basically, the ﬁrst is an IRR treating the NAV as a last cash ﬂow while the second is
an IRR based on accrued cash ﬂows only.
9A similar idea can be found in Meyer/Weidig (2003).
10Figure 2: Average IRR(NAV) and IRR(CF) over a Funds Lifetime for Liq-
uitaded Funds (Number of Funds: 95)
RNAVN PN
t=0|CFt| ≤ q
Here, RNAVN stands for the residual net asset value of a fund at end of
period N.10 Of course, q is a parameter that has to be chosen in an arbitrary
way. In this study we will work with a q equal to 0.1 for one sample and
0.2 for another, respectively. Hence, we add non-liquidated funds to our
sample if their residual value is not higher than 10% for one sample and 20%
for another sample, respectively, of the undiscounted sum of the absolute
value of all previously accrued cash ﬂows. For these funds the IRR (CF) is
calculated under the assumption that the residual net asset value represents
a hypothetical distribution accrued by the end of our observation period.
The condition stated above can be simpliﬁed by taking into account that







10In principle, it would be better to use discounted cash ﬂows in the denominator rather
than undiscounted. However, we believe that this diﬀerence is not so important, given
that it can be taken into account by adjusting the parameter q. Therefore, we stick to
the approach presented here, as in this case the condition can be easily transformed into
another very simple condition.
11Here TDt is the capital paid into the fund at time t, while Dt is the
distribution paid by the fund at time t. Hence, in this way we disentangle









the initial condition stating which funds should be added to the data set
can be rewritten as follows:
1+DPIN
RV PIN ≥ 1
q
All funds that are not liquidated by 30 June 2003, and satisfying this
condition for q=0.1 together with the liquidated funds are put in sample I,
while all funds satisfying this condition for q=0.2 together with all liquidated
funds are put into sample II. As we will see in table 3, sample I has 200 funds,
while sample II has 262 funds. This is a perceivable increase given that we
have only 95 liquidated funds.
Liquidated Funds Sample I Sample II
Number of Observations
VC 47 99 131
BO 48 101 131
Total 95 200 262
Size in mio. Euro
Average 52.14 78.05 121.24
Median 26.20 33.10 39.10
Stdev 103.62 128.89 433.76
Table 3: Description of our Three Data Samples
124 Cash Flow Characteristics of European Pri-
vate Equity Funds
In this section we will highlight some important cash ﬂow patterns of Eu-
ropean private equity funds. The peak of aggregated take downs, i.e. the
aggregated sum of funds committed by investors or limited partners to all
private equity funds, as well as aggregated distributions or disbursements,
i.e. the sum of funds returned by all private equtiy funds to their investors,
is in the year 2000. The whole time pattern of take downs and distributions
is shown in Figure 3. Take downs of committed capital by all sample funds
in year 2002 aggregate to Euro 18.4bn; simultaneously, distributions aggre-
gated to Euro 13.5bn. It should be noted that according to EVCA reports
the aggregated volume of funds raised in the European private equity indus-
try in the year 2000 was almost Euro 44bn. Hence, we can infer that for this
particular year the sample of funds provided by TVE for the purpose of this
study covers about 43% of the fund volume tracked by EVCA.
Figure 3: Time Pattern of Aggregated Sample Funds’ Cash Flows (Number
of Funds: 777)
13The growth in the private equity industry is strongly correlated with the
performance of the public equity market. In fact, the growth of private equity
investments during the 1990s was strongly correlated to the lasting positive
stock market performance during this period.
As far as structural issues of cash ﬂow patterns are concerned four ques-
tions appear in this context. First, how long does it typically take until
the general partner has taken down the committed capital? Second, what is
the typical time pattern of disbursement? Third, how long does it typically
take for a limited partner to get back his invested capital? Fourth, are these
patterns diﬀerent depending on fund size?
An answer to the ﬁrst question is given by Figure 4. The average fund
draws down 23% of the total investment volume when starting its business.
Within the ﬁrst three years 60% of total committed capital is invested in the
fund. It should be noted that according to Ljungqvist/Richardson (2002) the
average US fund draws down 57% of the committed capital within the ﬁrst
three years. Moreover, it seems that capital drawdown is faster for venture
capital funds than for buyout funds. However, the diﬀerence is not that large,
as general partner of venture capital funds have drawn down 68% of capital
within the ﬁrst three years, while for buyout funds this ratio is about 57%.
Finally, from Figure 5 it can be seen that there is only a slight diﬀerence
in the take down patterns between the various stages. Only late-stage and
balanced funds take down their capital faster than the average funds.
14Figure 4: Time Pattern of Take Downs for Diﬀerent Types of Funds (Sample
II, Number of Funds: 262)
Figure 5: Time Pattern of Take Downs by Funds’ Stage (Sample II, Number
of Funds: 262)
15Figure 6: Time Pattern of Distributions for Diﬀerent Types of Funds (Sample
II, Number of Funds: 262)
Figure 7: Time Pattern of Distributions by Funds’ Stage (Sample II, Number
of Funds: 262)
16Two questions have been raised in the context of disbursements. First,
what can be said about the typical time pattern of disbursements? Inter-
estingly, from ﬁgure 6 it follows that average disbursements are distributed
almost uniformly over a fund’s lifetime. This is true, at least, if we ignore
the relatively small distributions funds disburse in their ﬁrst year and after
the year 12 of their lifetime. In fact, our calculations show that 53% of total
disbursements are paid out within the ﬁrst seven years.
However, this uniform distribution does not hold for the single fund stages
as can be seen from ﬁgure 7. In fact, for later-stage funds it takes much longer
to achieve a 50% distribution ratio compared with the average fund in our
sample.
Figure 8: Value Weighted Average Payback Period (Sample II, Number of
Funds:262)
The second question regarding disbursements is even more important for
investors in private equity funds and relates to the payback issue. In fact,
from a liquidity oriented perspective it may be very interesting to have an
idea how long it takes on average to get back the money from a private
17equity investment. It is very interesting to see from ﬁgure 8 that for a
European private equity fund investor, it takes 7.5 years to get the money
back. Ljungqvist/Richardson (2002) report that for US private equity funds
the payback period is slightly below seven years. It should be noted that this
is the payback period an investor faces, if he allocates his money according
to the size of single funds. Moreover, we can see that buyout funds have a
lower payback period than venture capital funds. 11
Finally, to answer the fourth question raised in the context of cash ﬂow
patterns, we investigate whether the payback period is really diﬀerent de-
pending on a fund’s size. As one can see from ﬁgure 9 it is not clear, at least
at a ﬁrst glance, whether the payback behaviour is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for
diﬀerent fund size brackets. In fact, a statistical analysis reveals that the
partial correlation coeﬃcient between these two variables is negative, but
statistically not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Hence, we have to conclude
that the payback pattern does not depend on fund size.
Another question in this context is, whether payback pattern changed
over time. Here it is presumed that funds with vintage years in the 1990s
had shorter payback periods as they had better exit opportunities than funds
founded during the eighties or even earlier. This is corroborated by ﬁgure 10,
which indicates that the payback has become shorter the later the fund has
been founded. In fact, the correlation coeﬃcient between these two variables
is -0.5 and statistically highly signiﬁcant.
11We analyzed the payback period for our three data samples in detail, which is shown
in table 4. Furthermore we examined the cash ﬂow pattern of all 777 funds, which yields us
to an average value weighted payback period of 7.4 years and identical cash ﬂow patterns.
18Figure 9: Fund Size and Payback Period (Sample I, Number of Funds: 200)
Figure 10: Vintage Year of the Funds and Payback Period (Sample I, Number
of Funds: 200)
195 Assessing the Risk-/Return-Characteristics
of Private Equity Funds
It has already been mentioned that a private equity investment can be un-
dertaken directly or indirectly via a private equity fund. Therefore, risk-
/return-characteristics of private equity investments can basically be deﬁned
from two diﬀerent perspectives, either if we assess the return distribution
of a company’s speciﬁc investment or if we assess the return distribution of
an investment in a private equity fund. As far as risk management issues
are concerned the ﬁrst perspective is especially relevant from the viewpoint
of a General Partner, as he is supposed to make congruent decisions with
respect to the allocation of capital to portfolio ﬁrms. The second perspective
is relevant for a private or institutional investor who considers acting as a
limited partner, i.e. to invest money in a private equity fund. Hence, when
talking about return distributions one should make clear as to what kind of
return processes he is referring to: returns generated at the level of a single
portfolio company or returns generated at the level of a private equity fund.
As already mentioned, in this study we are focussing on return distribu-
tion at the fund level. From an economic point of view, the most important
characteristic of private equity investments are the missing or highly imper-
fect secondary markets. As a consequence, for any single fund investment
there are only a few points in time for which transaction prices can be ob-
served: when limited partners pay in their capital and when the investment
is liquidated. Usually, such transactions do not happen very frequently. As
a consequence, no intermediate series of historical returns is available and,
hence, estimating the performance of a private equity fund becomes a dif-
ﬁcult issue. It is well known that there are at least two solutions in this
regard.12 The ﬁrst is to estimate a private equity fund’s return on the basis
of net asset values (NAV). The basic problem is that net asset values are
subject to valuation biases and, hence, returns estimated on this basis will
be biased as well.
The idea of the approach followed in this paper is to circumvent these
problems by inferring the private equity fund’s return only on the basis of
its cash ﬂow history. In this way one could presume that an unbiased re-
turn estimation will be possible. However, even under this approach serious
12A detailed summary with respect to the solutions proposed in the literature can be
found in Kaserer/Wagner/Achleitner (2004).
20methodological problems will arise. They are discussed in the following sec-
tions.
5.1 The Cash Flow Based IRR as a Return Measure
It is often argued that the return on a private equity investment should be
measured by using a value weighted return measure, i.e. the internal rate of
return (IRR). The IRR gives the discount rate that makes the present value
of all cash ﬂows equal to zero. Mathematically, the IRR can be expressed as
the solution to the following equation:
PT
t=0 CFt (1 + IRR)
−t = 0
Here T is the lifetime of the fund and CFt is the cash ﬂow accrued over
period t. The rationale behind this is the following. A value weighted return
is heavily inﬂuenced by the time pattern of cash ﬂows on which its calculation
is based, while a time weighted return is deﬁned as being independent of this
time pattern.13 If a fund manager is interested in assessing the performance
of an open-end public market investment fund, he will not have control over
time patterns of cash ﬂows and his performance should be measured on the
basis of a time weighted return. In fact, this is what is done in quoted mutual
funds open to retail and institutional investors.
Things can be diﬀerent, if one looks at a private equity fund. It could
be argued that the general partner of such a fund has, at least to a certain
extent, control over the time pattern of cash ﬂows. If this is the case, it
is asserted, his performance should be measured on the basis of a value-
weighted return. This, however, is not correct as it is well-known that the
IRR is not a return measure. In fact, a fund A may have a higher IRR than
a fund B but at a given discount rate nevertheless a lower net present value.
This is due to the fact that the IRR-method assumes cash ﬂows generated by
an investment to be reinvested at the IRR. This is obviously not a purposeful
reinvestment assumption. Speciﬁcally, as far as an investment in a private
equity fund is concerned, the limited partner may be interested to know the
terminal wealth of his investment relative to the terminal wealth of a risk
13It should be noted that a time weighted return over a period of length T is simply
the geometric mean of the single period return realizations; a value-weighted return can
be regarded as a weighted average of these returns.
21equivalent public market investment. Evidently, the IRR cannot be used for
answering this question. Moreover, it will be shown that even a corrected
IRR, like the excess-IRR, i.e. the diﬀerence between the IRR and the return
generated on a public market investment, is unable to answer this question.
In fact, we will show that the excess-IRR is systematically biased. This is
why we stick to another performance measure that we call the public market
equivalent. It is explained in the following section.
5.2 The Cash Flow Based PME as a Return Measure
The PME approach starts from the following simple question: Given that the
investor invests – in terms of present value – Euro 1 in a private equity fund,
how many Euros would he have to invest in a given public market index in
order to generate a cash ﬂow equivalent investment and, hence, in order to
end up with the same terminal wealth? The PME is exactly the answer to this
question. It is nothing else than the ratio of the terminal wealth obtained
when investing in a private equity fund and reinvesting intermediate cash
ﬂows in a given public market benchmark compared to the terminal wealth
obtained when investing the same amount of money in the benchmark. In
this way a complete performance ranking of all available funds is possible.








Here, RIt is the net return of a public market index in period t, while cft
is the normalized positive cash ﬂow (distribution) of the private equity fund
in period t.14 As we can only observe the returns on a market index that
are gross of management fees, we will make the following correction in this
study: For an equity index we assume management fees to be equal to 50bp
per year, while for a bond index these fees are assumed to be equal to 20 bp.
Hence, the net yearly return is equal the gross yearly return, as indicated by
the index performance, times 0.995 and times 0.998 respectively.
14In this context, positive cash ﬂows are normalized by dividing every single positive
cash ﬂow accruing in period 1 or later with the present value of all investments, i.e. the
present value of all negative cash ﬂows. In this way the cash ﬂows are normalized to an
initial investment with a present value of Euro 1.
22One last methodological remark with respect to this example should be
made. From an investor’s viewpoint the most important question is, of
course, whether a private equity investment has a higher expected return
than a public market investment. It should be noted that this question can
be answered in two diﬀerent ways. First, one can compare the public and the
private investment on the basis of the PME. Second, the out-performance of
private equity can be calculated as the average of a return diﬀerence. In this
case one calculates ﬁrst the cross-sectional average performance of all the
funds on the basis of their terminal wealth. This average return is then com-
pared with the average of all public market investment returns that could
have been realised as an alternative to the private equity investment. It
should be noted that the ranking obtained under both alternatives can be
diﬀerent. This may be quite surprising. It is due to the fact that the PME is
an average return ratio while the second method corresponds to an average
return diﬀerence. In general, an investor would be more interested in esti-
mating the return diﬀerence of two diﬀerent investment alternatives, as this
diﬀerence indicates the gain – or loss – in wealth per Euro invested when re-
alising one strategy instead of the other. For this reason we do not stop with
calculating the PME. Instead we use it for deriving a result with respect to
the return diﬀerence between a private equity fund investment and a speciﬁc
public market investment. This is done as follows.




˜ It−1 − 1
Here, It is the period t value of the public market performance index used
for reinvesting private equity cash ﬂows.
˜ yt = ln

1 + ˜ RIt

Note, that a tilde indicates that we have to deal with a random variable.
If the period is set equal to one year, y is the continuously compounded rate
of return on a public market investment. According to our deﬁnitions the







Here, it should be noted that the left hand side of the preceding equation
gives the terminal wealth of a Euro 1 private equity investment. The ﬁrst
expression on the right hand side gives the terminal wealth of a Euro 1
investment in the public market instrument. According to our deﬁnition of
the PME, we need a public market investment of PME·Euro1 in order to end
up with the same terminal value as with the private equity fund. Therefore,
the right hand side has to be multiplied with PME. Now, by deﬁning






and using the deﬁnition of the total private equity return in the equation
before we get:
˜ x = 1
T
PT
t=1 ˜ yt + ln ˜ PME

Assuming y and x to be identically and independently distributed (iid) the
expected continuously compounded yearly returns can be derived as follows:
E [˜ yt] = µy
E [˜ x] = µy + E
h
1
T ln ˜ PME
i
= µx
Taking into account that σy and σx deﬁnes the standard deviation of the
random variables x and y, the expectation of the yearly compounded rate of




























245.3 Risk Characteristics of Cash Flow Based Returns
As far as the IRR-measure is concerned, risk characteristics can simply be
derived from calculating distributional parameters. For this purpose we will
present the most common parameters used in the literature. These are the
average, the median, the standard deviation, as well as the highest and lowest
realised IRRs.
For the PME the same distribution parameters can be calculated. How-
ever, we will be more interested in inferring the risk characteristics of private
equity returns calculated on the basis of the PME approach. Under the
already introduced assumption that x and y are iid it follows:
V ar[˜ yt] = σ2
y
V ar[˜ x] = σ2
y + V ar
h
1































= exp[2µx + σ2
x](exp[σ2
x] − 1)
Finally, it should be noted that under this approach it follows that the
correlation coeﬃcient of the continuously compounded yearly returns of a
private equity investment and a public market investment is deﬁned as fol-
lows:




T ln ˜ PME]
σx·σy = ρxy
5.4 Correlation Characteristics of Diﬀerent Reinvest-
ment Hypotheses
In the preceding sections we did not make any speciﬁc assumptions with
respect to the public market instrument, which is used for reinvesting a
25private equity fund’s cash ﬂows. For our empirical analysis we have, of
course, to make speciﬁc assumptions with respect to the instruments used.
For this purpose we will allow for two diﬀerent strategies:
1) Cash ﬂows are reinvested in the MSCI Europe Equity Index,
2) Cash ﬂows are reinvested in the J.P. Morgan European Govern-
ment Bond Index.
Given this, the following two additional questions arise with respect to
the correlation structure of the private equity investment: First, assuming
that alternative 1) is realised, what is the correlation structure of the private
equity investment return with the bond market? Second, assuming that al-
ternative 2) is realised, what is the correlation structure of the private equity
investment return with the equity market? The answers can be given in the
context of the PME-approach presented here. In order to make things pre-
cise, let us assume that the formula introduced in the two preceding sections
refer to alternative 1), i.e. a reinvestment in a public equity market index.
If, instead, we would like to refer to alternative 2), i.e. a reinvestment in a
public bond market index, we introduce the following formula:
˜ zt = ln

1 + ˜ RBt

Here, RBt is the return on the bond index in period t. The return of a















Now, the total private equity return realised under alternative 2) can be
written as:
26˜ xB = 1
T
PT
t=1 ˜ zt + ln ˜ BME

Assuming xB and z to be identically and independently distributed (iid)
expected continuously compounded yearly returns can be derived as follows:
E [˜ zt] = µz
E [ ˜ xB] = µz + E
h
1
T ln ˜ BME
i
= µxB
Taking into account that σz and σxB deﬁnes the standard deviation of
the random variables z and xB, the expectation of the yearly compounded




























Under the already introduced assumption that xB and z are iid it follows:
V ar[˜ zt] = σ2
z
V ar[ ˜ xB] = σ2
z + V ar
h
1


































The correlation coeﬃcient of the continuously compounded yearly returns
of a private equity investment and a public bond market investment is deﬁned
as follows:
27corr[ ˜ xB, ˜ z] = σz
σxB +
Cov[˜ z, 1
T ln ˜ BME]
σxB·σz = ρxBz
Finally, for the correlation structures of private equity returns under alter-
native 1) with the public equity market returns and of private equity returns
under alternative 2) with the public bond market returns it follows:




T ln ˜ PME]
σx·σz = ρxz




T ln ˜ BME]
σxB·σy = ρxBy
6 Empirical Results
6.1 Results with Respect to IRR
In this section we present the results that have been obtained with respect
to IRRs. Initially we present in ﬁgure 11 the result obtained with respect
to NAV based IRRs (IRR (NAV)). This ﬁgure is directly taken from TVE,
without further examination towards accuracy from our side. As one can
see, funds with vintage years after 1997 have performed unsatisfactory on the
basis of the IRR (NAV). Evidently, this is due to a decline in market prices
since 2000 and the induced pressure to decrease the book values of portfolio
companies. Additionally, the J-curve phenomenon may be responsible for
the negative IRR (NAV) of the funds founded in the years 2000 till 2003.
Moreover, there is a second eﬀect that can be seen from ﬁgure 11. Funds
with vintage years 1992 to 1997 performed rather well on the basis of the
IRR (NAV). By restricting our sample to liquidated funds only we create
a downward bias, as one can assume that several funds with vintage years
belonging to this period are not yet liquidated. This is an important mo-
tivation for increasing the data universe according to the method described
in the preceding chapter. In this way we would include more funds with
vintage years in the nineties in our sample. Simultaneously we can control
for the selection bias by integrating only funds with small relative residual
asset values.
The private equity fund performance on the basis of IRR (CF) becomes
visible in Table 4. As already described in section 3.2, we extended the
28Figure 11: Average IRR(NAV) by Vintage Year (Number of Funds: 777)
data universe by generating samples I and II on top of the sample consisting
of liquidated funds only. It should be noted that venture capital as well
as buyout funds have almost identical weights by number of funds in our
samples.
According to what has been said previously, the IRRs (CF) of samples I
and II are perceivably higher than the IRR (CF) of the sample consisting of
liquidated funds. In fact, starting with an IRR (CF) of 10% for the liquidated
sample we reach an IRR (CF) of 13% for sample I and 14% for sample II.
These ﬁgures are slightly lower than the results of Kaplan/Schoar (2003) for
the US-market, as they report an average IRR of 17%. For buyout funds they
report an IRR of 18%, for venture capital funds of 17%. Also these results
are slightly higher than ours, as one can see in Table 4. Simultaneously,
the standard deviation of the IRRs increases signiﬁcantly when expanding
the data universe. Our method to include well performing as well as bad
performing funds in the sample, has a positive net eﬀect and drives the IRR
upward. It also should be noted that the average payback in all the three
diﬀerent sub-samples is about 90 months or 7.5 to 7.8 years. This is nearly
the same than the value-weighted average payback period of the total sample.
Table 5 reports the excess IRR (CF) of diﬀerent sub-samples. This excess
return is deﬁned as the IRR (CF) of a single fund minus the IRR of the MSCI
Europe index realised over the lifetime of the fund. For the cross-sectional
statistics that are reported here, one can see, that in most of the cases the
excess IRRs are positive.
29IRR and Payback IRR(CF) Payback in Month
VC BO Total VC BO Total
Liquidated Funds
Average 7.32% 12.64% 10.01% 108.53 83.63 94.62
Median 4.77% 9.79% 7.28% 110.00 84.50 95.50
75th Percentile 12.98% 18.67% 14.24% 143.50 113.75 120.50
25th Percentile -4.00% 8.23% 0.00% 87.50 62.25 66.50
Min -12.12% -13.66% -13.66% 32.00 21.00 21.00
Max 103.73% 88.05% 103.73% 215.00 139.00 215.00
Stdev 17.82% 17.67% 17.85% 41.38 33.61 38.99
Sample I
Average 12.00% 13.39% 12.69% 102.79 78.38 90.35
Median 8.05% 10.80% 9.14% 104.00 70.00 90.00
75th Percentile 15.65% 18.76% 17.13% 127.50 106.75 118.50
25th Percentile 1.90% 9.00% 4.45% 74.50 54.25 61.50
Min -13.56% -13.66% -13.66% 16.00 20.00 16.00
Max 153.91% 88.05% 153.91% 215.00 169.00 215.00
Stdev 22.06% 16.18% 19.34% 41.90 33.94 39.86
Sample II
Average 12.50% 15.63% 14.07% 99.58 81.48 90.09
Median 7.40% 11.00% 9.56% 96.50 71.00 84.00
75th Percentile 16.31% 19.95% 18.17% 127.00 108.75 118.00
25th Percentile 0.00% 1.69% 0.05% 69.50 54.25 60.75
Min -13.56% -13.66% -13.66% 16.00 18.00 16.00
Max 181.90% 133.25% 181.90% 215.00 200.00 215.00
Stdev 24.95% 20.59% 22.89% 42.84 37.35 40.97
Table 4: Size, IRR(CF) and Payback Period of our Samples by Diﬀerent
Fund Types
30Excess-IRR of MSCI Europe VC BO Total
Liquidated Funds
Average -2.27% 3.37% 0.58%
Median -4.17% -0.77% -2.70%
75th Percentile 1.76% 9.47% 5.21%
25th Percentile -10.84% -7.08% -9.21%
Min -22.24% -24.00% -24.00%
Max 90.99% 84.13% 90.99%
Stdev 17.41% 19.14% 18.42%
Number of Ob. 47 48 95
Sample I
Average 3.62% 5.29% 4.45%
Median -1.37% 1.57% 0.61%
75th Percentile 5.94% 12.56% 10.24%
25th Percentile -8.02% -6.17% -7.32%
Min -22.24% -24.00% -24.00%
Max 169.35% 84.13% 169.35%
Stdev 24.27% 17.16% 21.01%
Number of Ob. 101 99 200
Sample II
Average 5.10% 8.25% 6.68%
Median 0.64% 3.53% 1.71%
75th Percentile 8.22% 12.87% 11.23%
25th Percentile -6.99% -5.04% -5.92%
Min -22.24% -20.00% -22.24%
Max 176,0% 127.00% 176.00%
Stdev 25.07% 20.63% 22.96%
Number of Ob. 131 131 262
Table 5: Excess-IRR(CF) of MSCI Europe
31Excess-IRR of J.P.M. Govt. VC BO Total
Liquidated Funds
Average 0.93% 6.55% 3.77%
Median -2.92% 3.33% 0.95%
75th Percentile 6.67% 13.34% 7.51%
25th Percentile -7.46% -5.08% -6.18%
Min -18.19% -19.86% -19.86%
Max 98.13% 85.04% 98.13%
Stdev 17.96% 18.05% 18.13%
Number of Ob. 47 48 95
Sample I
Average 4.69% 6.23% 5.45%
Median 0.70% 3.26% 1.24%
75th Percentile 7.89% 12.87% 10.94%
25th Percentile -6.31% -5.81% -5.89%
Min -21.72% -19.86% -21.72%
Max 147.40% 85.04% 147.40%
Stdev 22.12% 16.30% 19.42%
Number of Ob. 101 99 200
Sample II
Average 5.15% 8.25% 6.70%
Median 0.59% 3.48% 1.64%
75th Percentile 10.49% 13.42% 12.51%
25th Percentile -7.65% -4.73% -6.76%
Min -21.72% -24.00% -24.00%
Max 187.00% 134.00% 187.00%
Stdev 27.07% 21.69% 24.53%
Number of Ob. 131 131 262
Table 6: Excess-IRR(CF) of the J.P.M. European Govt. Bond Index
32Figure 12: IRR(CF) by Vintage Year, Sample I
Moreover, buyout funds seem to have consistently higher IRRs than ven-
ture capital funds. A similar picture is presented in table 6 where the excess
returns are given with respect to the J.P. Morgan Government Bond index.
The IRRs of diﬀerent vintage years can be inferred from ﬁgure 12. One can
presume, funds that have been founded later have, on average, a higher IRR.
The correlation coeﬃcient of both variables is 0.4 and statistically highly
signiﬁcant.
A further aspect to look at is whether the IRR (CF) is diﬀerent depending
on the size of the fund. Based on the data presented in ﬁgure 13 no clear-cut
answer to this question is possible. However, by calculating the coeﬃcient of
correlation one can see that this is positive and statistically highly signiﬁcant.
Hence, as far as the IRR (CF) is concerned we have to conclude that fund
size has a positive impact on performance.
Additionally, it seems intriguing to ﬁnd out if the structure of cash ﬂows is
related to performance measured in terms of IRR (CF). One would presume
that well performing funds should be able to return the money earlier to
investors and, hence, that there should be a negative association between
the IRR (CF) and the length of the payback period, as it is indicated in
ﬁgure 14. Moreover, the correlation coeﬃcient between the two variables is
negative and highly signiﬁcant.
33Figure 13: IRR(CF) by Fund Size, Sample I
Figure 14: IRR(CF) by Payback Period, Sample I
346.2 PME Based Performance Characteristics
The PME-based performance measures have already been introduced under
5.2. In this section we will present the empirical results with respect to the
PME and BME as well as with respect to the index and private equity funds’
returns RI,RB and RPE. We have chosen two diﬀerent alternative indexes
for calculating the public market equivalent. First, we used a public equity
index, speciﬁcally the MSCI Europe index.15 Alternatively we used a public
bond index. As we are performing a European study we decided to use a
European government bond index, speciﬁcally we opted for the J.P. Morgan
European Government Bond Performance Index. However, this index is only
available back to 1993. As we need a longer index history we used the REXP
index for periods from 1993 backwards.16
Finally, we would like to emphasize again that we assumed the index in-
vestment not to be free of cost. This is necessary as otherwise a comparison
between private equity returns, which are net of management fees, and public
market index returns, which basically assume cost free investing, would be
biased against the private equity industry. Of course, it is diﬃcult to make
a precise assessment of transaction costs, including management fees, associ-
ated with an investment in a public equity or bond market. These costs may
diﬀer from country to country as well as from investor to investor. Therefore,
we ﬁnally agreed to assume transaction costs of 50bp per year for a public
equity investment and 20bp for a public bond investment.
Having said this we can now present our results. First of all, table 7 gives
the distribution of pooled PME and BME for our three diﬀerent sample
deﬁnitions as well as diﬀerent fund types. The pooled PME is calculated
as the cross sectional average of all PE funds included in the sample. The
average PME is only larger than one for sample II, while the value-weighted
average is larger than one for sample I and II. Moreover, we can see that there
are obviously some good performing funds with very high PMEs, but also
some poor performers with PMEs close to zero. Also the standard deviation
is rather high. Table 8 shows the time-series PME and BME which are
computed on the basis of annually average PMEs. In general, the results
15We did not opt for one of the STOXX indexes, as they are available only back to
1986. The MSCI Europe has a much longer history. However, one can imagine that both
indexes are highly correlated.
16The REXP is a performance index of German treasury bonds over the whole maturity
range.
35for the time series PME are higher than for the cross sectional PME. In
the following section, we use the time-series distributional parameters for
calculating the return and risk characteristics of private equity.
Again we have to question whether the performance of the sample funds
is diﬀerent among diﬀerent size brackets. Figure 15 gives the impression that
there is no relationship between size and performance measured in terms of
the PME. In fact, this is also true from a statistical point of view, as no
signiﬁcant correlation can be detected between these two variables.
Figure 15: PME and Fund Size, Sample I
As far as the relationship of the PME with the vintage year is concerned
ﬁgure 16 gives a seemingly clear picture: the later the vintage year, the
higher the PME on average. This is also true from a statistical point of view
as there is a signiﬁcant positive correlation between these two variables. This
corroborates the view that private equity funds with vintage years during the
nineties performed especially well.
36Figure 16: PME and Vintage Year, Sample I
Figure 17: PME and Payback Period, Sample I
37PME BME
VC BO Total VC BO Total
Liquidated Funds
Average 0.82 0.90 0.86 1.11 1.07 1.09
Median 0.68 0.89 0.80 0.81 1.09 0.99
75th Percentile 0.97 1.24 1.10 1.38 1.37 1.38
25th Percentile 0.33 0.51 0.42 0,54 0.64 0.58
Min 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.07
Max 6.97 2.79 6.97 10.45 2.95 10.45
Stdev 1.01 0.53 0.81 1.51 0.60 1.14
Value-weighted 0.94 1.21
Sample I
Average 0.98 0.94 0.96 1.14 1.24 1.20
Median 0.75 0.86 0.82 1.06 1.02 1.03
75th Percentile 1.17 1.24 1.23 1.44 1.43 1.43
25th Percentile 0.40 0.59 0.51 0.66 0.63 0.66
Min 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.02
Max 6.97 2.79 6.97 10.45 2.95 10.45
Stdev 1.15 0.51 0.89 1.02 0.59 1.11
Value-weighted 1.04 1.27
Sample II
Average 1.01 1.06 1.03 1.25 1.21 1.23
Median 0.76 0.92 0.85 0.99 1.13 1.07
75th Percentile 1.22 1.35 1.27 1.27 1.42 1.45
25th Percentile 0.44 0.61 0.55 0.60 0.77 0.66
Min 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.02
Max 7.27 4.61 7.27 10.45 5.27 10.45
Stdev 1.15 0.70 0.95 1.38 0.74 1.10
Value-weighted 1.16 1.30
Table 7: Pooled PME and BME of Private Equity Funds by Sample Deﬁni-
tions
38PME BME
VC BO Total VC BO Total
Liquidated Funds
Average 0.86 1.02 1.04 1.23 1.25 1.38
Median 0.63 1.02 0.82 0.80 1.23 1.02
Min 0.28 0.58 0.28 0.52 0.73 0.61
Max 3.03 1.74 3.03 4.39 1.82 4.39
Stdev 0.72 0.40 0.66 1.02 0.38 0.87
Sample I
Average 1.20 0.95 1.15 1.14 1.36 1.19
Median 0.82 0.92 0.87 1.12 1.21 1.20
Min 0.28 0.62 0.28 0.21 0.84 0.21
Max 4.56 1.41 4.56 2.37 2.95 1.72
Stdev 1.09 0.25 0.98 0.43 0.54 0.32
Sample II
Average 1.14 1.08 1.09 1.32 1.20 1.26
Median 0.81 0.96 0.88 1.15 1.13 1.17
Min 0.28 0.62 0.28 0.61 0.55 0.61
Max 3.82 1.84 2.82 2.86 1.82 2.38
Stdev 0.90 0.35 0.63 0.68 0.39 0.46
Table 8: Time Series PME and BME of Private Equity Funds by Sample
Deﬁnitions
39Finally, we investigated if the structure of cash ﬂows is related to perfor-
mance measured in terms of PME. One would presume that well performing
funds should be able to return the money earlier to investors and, hence,
there should be a negative association between the PME and the length of
the payback period. This is, in fact, true and is visualised in ﬁgure 17.
Moreover, the correlation coeﬃcient between the two variables is negative
and highly signiﬁcant.
As a second step we calculated the private equity returns RPE based on
the PME approach. It should be noted here that only time series-based
distributional parameters with respect to PME can be used. They have been
presented in table 8. As shown in table 9 to table 12 the average yearly return
of an investment in the MSCI Europe was 14.12% over the period 1980-2003
with a standard deviation of 18.85%. Assuming a risk free interest rate of
3% the Sharpe ratio reaches 59.00%. The expected PME-based return of
a private equity investment during this period was 13.40% for the sample
of liquidated funds, 14.67% for the extended sample I and 13.50% for the
extended sample II. The standard deviation is in a close range of 18% to
19%. For this reason, and taking into account that the return diﬀerence of
private equity for liquidated funds and sample II is negative with respect to
public equity, the Sharpe ratios for the private equity funds are distinctly
lower than for the diversiﬁed public equity market investment. Only sample
I has a higher return as well as a higher Sharpe ratio than the public markets.
Finally, the PME-based correlation coeﬃcient between the private equity and
the public equity returns are, depending on the sample deﬁnition, between
0.96 and 0.84. Given the deﬁnition of the investment strategy, this is not
surprising as distributions are reinvested in the public market index.
An alternative to this is that cash ﬂows generated by private equity funds
are reinvested in a public bond market index. For that purpose we used the J.
P. Morgan European Government Bond Performance Index chained up with
the REXP Index in order to cover periods backward from 1993. The results
are presented in the tables below. The average government bond index return
over the period 1980 to 2003 was 7.98% with a standard deviation of 4.10%.
This leads to a Sharpe ratio of 121%. Compared the BME based private
equity return under this reinvestment hypothesis is 9.57% for the sample of
liquidated funds with a standard deviation of 6.70%. For sample extension
I and II the rates of return are 8.41% and 8.60% with standard deviations
of 5.59% and 5.63% respectively. Sharpe ratios are between 96 and 98% and
therefore lower than for the public equity investment. Correlation coeﬃcients
40with the bond market investment are between 59% and 74%.
From tables 12 and 13 one can see that the return diﬀerence between
buyout and venture capital funds is rather small under the PME approach.
Finally, we once more presume that the private equity returns are higher
for funds with later vintage years. For this purpose we recalculated the
returns for the funds of our three samples, assuming that only funds with
a vintage year starting from 1989 are considered. The results for sample II
are presented in table 14. As one can see, our presumption is correct. This
sub-sample of private equity funds now generates an overperformance also
with respect to the public market index. This eﬀect is also observable for the
liquidated funds and still for sample I.
Sample: Liquidated Funds
J.P.M. European Govt. Index MSCI Europe
Historical Return 7.98% Historical Return 14.12%
Standard Deviation 4.10% Standard Deviation 18.85%
Sharpe Ratio 121.31% Sharpe Ratio 59.00%
Private Equity Private Equity
Estimated Return 9.57% Estimated Return 13.40%
Standard Deviation 6.70% Standard Deviation 19.06%
Sharpe Ratio 98.07% Sharpe Ratio 54.57%
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Table 9: PME and BME Based Private Equity and Public Market Returns
(Liquidated Funds, 1980-2003)
41Sample I
J.P.M. European Govt. Index MSCI Europe
Historical Return 7.98% Historical Return 14.12%
Standard Deviation 4.10% Standard Deviation 18.85%
Sharpe Ratio 121.31% Sharpe Ratio 59.00%
Private Equity Private Equity
Estimated Return 8.41% Estimated Return 14.67%
Standard Deviation 5.59% Standard Deviation 19.21%
Sharpe Ratio 96.74% Sharpe Ratio 60.77%
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Table 10: PME and BME Based Private Equity and Public Market Returns
(Sample I,1980-2003)
Sample II
J.P.M. European Govt. Index MSCI Europe
Historical Return 7.98% Historical Return 14.12%
Standard Deviation 4.10% Standard Deviation 18.85%
Sharpe Ratio 121.31% Sharpe Ratio 59.00%
Private Equity Private Equity
Estimated Return 8.60% Estimated Return 13.50%
Standard Deviation 5.63% Standard Deviation 17.88%
Sharpe Ratio 99.51% Sharpe Ratio 58.71%
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Table 11: PME and BME Based Private Equity and Public Market Returns
(Sample II, 1980-2003)
42Sample I: Buyout Funds Only
J.P.M. European Govt. Index MSCI Europe
Historical Return 7.98% Historical Return 14.12%
Standard Deviation 4.10% Standard Deviation 18.85%
Sharpe Ratio 121.31% Sharpe Ratio 59.00%
Private Equity Private Equity
Estimated Return 9.67% Estimated Return 12.59%
Standard Deviation 5.68% Standard Deviation 18.65%
Sharpe Ratio 117.55% Sharpe Ratio 51.43%
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Table 12: PME and BME Based Private Equity and Public Market Returns
(Sample I: Buyout Funds Only, 1980-2003)
Sample I: Venture Capital Funds Only
J.P.M. European Govt. Index MSCI Europe
Historical Return 7.98% Historical Return 14.12%
Standard Deviation 4.10% Standard Deviation 18.85%
Sharpe Ratio 121.31% Sharpe Ratio 59.00%
Private Equity Private Equity
Estimated Return 7.60% Estimated Return 15.17%
Standard Deviation 5.47% Standard Deviation 19.29%
Sharpe Ratio 84.07% Sharpe Ratio 63.07%
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Table 13: PME and BME Based Private Equity and Public Market Returns
(Sample I: Venture Capital Funds Only, 1980-2003)
43Sample II: Funds with a Vintage Year Later Than 1989
J.P.M. European Govt. Index MSCI Europe
Historical Return 7.84% Historical Return 10.26%
Standard Deviation 4.57% Standard Deviation 18.62%
Sharpe Ratio 105.90% Sharpe Ratio 38.98%
Private Equity Private Equity
Estimated Return 10.10% Estimated Return 12.50%
Standard Deviation 6.37% Standard Deviation 18.10%
Sharpe Ratio 111.53% Sharpe Ratio 52.47%
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Table 14: PME and BME Based Private Equity and Public Market Returns
(Sample II,1989-2003)
447 Conclusion
The objective of this study was to infer risk and return characteristics of
a European private equity fund investment from realized cash ﬂows only.
For that purpose a comprehensive data set has been provided by Thomson
Venture Economics. We documented the typical time pattern of cash ﬂows
for European private equity funds. Speciﬁcally, it is recorded that the average
European private equity fund draws down 23% of total commited capital on
the vintage date; within the ﬁrst three years 60% of the total commitment
is draw down. It turned out that limited partners on average get back the
money invested slightly after 7 years.
Over the time period from 1980 to June 2003, we calculated various per-
formance measures. For that purpose we used only liquidated funds or funds
with a small residual net asset value. Under this restriction one speciﬁc data
set consists of 200 funds. We documented a cash ﬂow based IRR of 12.7%
and an average excess-IRR of 4.5% relative to the MSCI Europe equity in-
dex. In order to circumvent the problems associated with the IRR-approach
we focused on the alternative public market equivalent approach. There it is
assumed that cash ﬂows generated by a private equity fund are reinvested in
a public market benchmark index. We record an average PME of 0.96 and a
value-weighted average PME of 1.04.
Based on the PME-approach we developed a viable methodology to es-
timate the return and risk characteristics of European private equity funds
and the correlation structure to public markets. As a benchmark index we
used the MSCI Europe Equity Index as well as the J.P.Morgan Government
Bond Index. Over the period 1980-2003 private equity funds generated an
overperformance with respect to the bond index and two of our three sam-
ples an underperformance with respect to the equity index. Over the period
1989-2003 private equity funds generated an overperformance with respect
to both indexes.
Finally, we analyzed to what extent performance measures are associated
with speciﬁc funds characteristics, like size, payback period and vintage year,
respectively. While the payback period and the vintage year seem to have
a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on a fund’s performance, the results with
respect to size are inconclusive.
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